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This article summarizes many of the criminal law decisions decided by the United States Supreme Court during
the last term.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Knock and Announce
In United States v. Ramirez, 118 S.Ct. 992 (1998), the
Oregon Police, acting on a tip, searched Ramirez's garage,
looking for an escaped prisoner, Alan Shelby. The police
observed a man resembling Shelby outside of Ramirez's
home and obtained a "no-knock" warrant. During the initial
raid, the police broke a window in the garage and pointed a
',\~un into the window to stop the occupants from arming
·" £hemselves. At the sound of the break-in, Ramirez grabbed
his pistol and shot into the garage. The police then shouted
"police," and he surrendered. Because Ramirez owned multiple guns and was a convicted felon, he was indicted on
federal charges for possession of a firearm by a felon.
In Richards v. Wisconsin, 118 S.Ct. 1416 (1997), the
Supreme Court had held that no knock warrants are justified
when police officers have a "reasonable suspicion" that
knocking and announcing their authority before entering
would be dangerous or futile, or inhibit the effective investigation of the crime. Ramirez argued that a higher standard
should apply when property is destroyed. The Court disagreed, holding that the lawfulness of the warrant is not
based on whether there is property damage. The standard
for a "no-knock" warrant is "reasonable suspicion" that announcing their presence would be dangerous and ineffective. The Court found that "reasonable suspicion" did exist
and the warrant was valid; Shelby had a history of violence
and a reliable informant had stated that he may have access to weapons. However, the manner in which the warrant is executed is important. Because the Fourth
Amendment is based on reasonableness, excessive and
unnecessary damage is prohibited. The damage in this
case was not excessive or unnecessary.
The Court also rejected a claim that 18 U.S.C. § 3109,

t

the federal statute that codifies the common law rule, was
violated because there were no "exigent circumstances" to
justify the destruction of property. According to the Court,
the statute authorizes the destruction of property in certain
circumstances. Therefore, as long as the officers have reason, they may incur property damage.

Parolees
In Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott,
118 S.Ct. 2014 (1998), the Supreme Court reversed a
Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruling, which had applied the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to parole hearings. As
one condition of parole, Scott could not possess a firearm.
Parole officials had received some evidence from a reliable
source that Scott kept weapons in his home. Parole officers, who searched the home, found firearms and a bow
and arrows. Consequently, the parole board sent Scott
back to prison. The Commonwealth Court reversed, based
on the fact that the warrant was improper, and the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania affirmed.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule
does not bar evidence in parole hearings. Although the
search was illegal, the use of the evidence was not. The
Court found that the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally
mandated but is rather a judicial rule created to deter illegal
searches. Therefore, the burdens and benefits of the rule
must be weighed. The Court beiieved that the cost of allowing dangerous criminals to remain on the streets after they
have violated their parole is quite high. In addition, there is
a great likelihood that these criminals will commit future
crimes. In contrast, the Court held that there would be very
little added deterrence since so much deterrence already
exist against illegal searches.
RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
In Gray v. Maryland, 118 S.Ct. 1151 (1998), a co-defendant's confession in a joint trial had been edited by replacing Gray's name with a blank space or the word "deleted:'
The Supreme Court found that this type of redaction violat-
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by the Clause now implicated the very privilege binding upon the other, the Murphy opinion sensibly recognized that if a witness could not assert the privilege in
such circumstances, the witness could be "whipsawed
into incriminating himself under both state and federal
law even though the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination is applicable to both:' ld. at 2227 (citation omitted).
This reasoning simply does not apply to foreign jurisdictions. The Court also rejected expansive language in its
prior cases which based the privilege, in part, on the "inviolability" of the human personality. "[W)hat we find in practice
is not the protection of personal testimonial inviolability, but
a conditional protection of testimonial privacy subject to
basic limits recognized before the framing and refined
through immunity doctrine in the intervening years:· ld. at
2232.

ed the rule in Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The defendants were tried jointly for beating a person to death.
One of the defendants, Anthony Bell, confessed to the
Baltimore police that he and others had killed the victim,
naming only Gray and another man. The trial court denied
Gray's motion for a separate trial and admitted Bell's confession into evidence, ordering that the statement be redacted. The confession was changed so that the names of Gray
and the other named assailant were replaced with the word
"deleted:'
The Supreme Court held that the cursory revisions to
Bell's statement did not place the confession outside the
bounds of the Bruton rule. The admission of the statement
by a non-testifying co-defendant, naming the other defendant, violated the Sixth Amendment's right to cross-examination. The Court found that the revisions made in the
statement were transparent. By using the word "deleted"
and asking the detectives if Gray's arrest was based on the
confession made clear what the edited words were.
"Redactions that simply replace a name with an obvious
blank space or a word such as 'deleted' or a symbol or other
similarly obvious indications of alteration ... leave statements that, considered as a class, so closely resemble
Bruton's unredacted statements that, in our view the law
must require the same result." ld. at 1155.

Clemency Procedures
In Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 118 S.Ct.
1244 (1998), the Supreme Court upheld Ohio's voluntary
clemency process. A prisoner sentenced to death filed suit
against the State, arguing that its voluntary clemency
process violated his Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment
rights. Woodard was convicted of murder while committing
a carjacking and sentenced to death. The conviction and
sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and the Court denied certiorari. The Ohio Adult Parole Authority then started
the clemency process in accordance with state law. Before
the first voluntary interview, Woodard filed suit for the violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Though the district court ruled for the State, the Sixth Circuit
did find something to Woodard's claim. The Sixth Circuit
,~; . ~
held that there was no state created liberty interest in
'f P
clemency, and therefore the district court was right in dismissing the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim.
This is because clemency rests solely with the discretion of
the Governor. However, the court of appeals did find that
there was a "second strand" of due process because the
clemency process has become an integral part of the death
sentence procedure. In addition, the Sixth Circuit found that
there was no real choice when it came to the clemency
hearing- one either confessed, incriminating oneself, or
did not receive clemency. The court of appeals found this
constitutionally suspect.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the voluntary nature of the interview did not violate the Fifth
Amendment. The Amendment protects only against compelled incrimination. The Court found that even though the
interview is not confidential and that authorities may draw
adverse inference from failure to answer, the testimony is
not "compelled" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
Woodard in that situation faces the same situation as a
criminal defendant in a trial. Difficult choices, even under
the pressures of a criminal trial, do not necessarily amount
to constitutional "compulsion." The Court wrote:
Long ago we held that a defendant who took the stand
in his own defense could not claim the privilege against
self-incrimination when the prosecution sought to
cross examine him. A defendant who takes the stand
in his own behalf may be impeached by proof of prior 1"'
convictions without violation of the Fifth Amendment
privilege. A defendant whose motion for acquittal at
the close of the Government's case is denied must
then elect whether to stand on his motion or to put on

FIFTH AMENDMENT
Immunity: Foreign Prosecutions
In United States v. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. 2218 (1998), the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the Fifth
Amendment protects against self-incrimination in a foreign
court. The Office of Special Investigations (OSI) of the
Department of Justice's Criminal Division subpoenaed
Balsys, a resident alien. The OSI sought testimony concerning Balsys' activities between 1940 and 1944 and his
1961 immigration to the United States. Balsys claimed Fifth
Amendment protection because he feared prosecution in a
foreign nation (Lithuania, Israel, or Germany).
The Supreme Court held that fear of prosecution in a foreign court fell outside the scope of the Fifth Amendment.
The Court found that, although Balsys was an alien, he was
still considered a "person" under the Clause and thus entitled to the same protections as citizens. The critical question, however, was whether a foreign prosecution was "a
criminal case" for the purposes of the Clause. Balsys
sought to argue a literal meaning to the phrase "any criminal
Case:' The Court, however, noted that the other provisions
of the Fifth Amendment (e.g., grand jury indictment, double
jeopardy, due process) applied only to the United States,
and therefore it would be odd for one clause to be so broad.
The Court' found that there was no common-law rule or
practice that fell within the bounds of this case. Looking
back at the history of the Amendment, the Court noted that
the Amendment did not apply to the states until Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Prior to that time, a person facing federal prosecution could not assert the privilege based
on the fear of prosecution in state courts. After Malloy, this
rule changed. In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52
(1964), the Court wrote:·
After Malloy; the Fifth Amendment limitation could no
longer be seen as framed for one jurisdiction alone,
each jurisdiction having instead become subject to the
same claim of privilege flowing from the one litigation.
Since fear of prosecution in the one jurisdiction bound
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144, 168-69 (1963). The Court went on to hold that the
statutory scheme was civil in nature.

a defense, with the accompanying risk that in doing so
he will augment the Government's case against him.
In each of these situations, there are undoubted pressures - generated by the strength of the Govern-- ment's case against him- pushing the criminal de-~ fendant to testify. But it ~as never been ~uggested t~at
- such pressures constitute "compulsion" for F1fth
Amendment purposes. ld. (citations omitted).
The Court also rejected the due process argument, with
four Justices finding that the Due Process Clause did not
apply to clemency proceedings and four Justices finding
that due process had been satisfied in this case.

Multiple Punishment
In Monge v. California, 118 S.Ct. 2246 (1998), the
Supreme Court addressed the double jeopardy implications
of an enhanced sentencing procedure. In Bullington v.
Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981 ), the Supreme Court had applied the Double Jeopardy Clause to capital sentencing, ruling that a defendant who received a life sentence in a death
penalty case could not be sentenced to death following a
successful appeal and retrial. Bullington, however, was an
exception to the Court's position that double jeopardy protection did not extend to sentencing proceedings. Monge
argued that Bullington should be extended to other types of
sentencing procedures.
Under California's "three-strikes" law, a convicted felon
with one prior conviction for a serious crime can qualify for
sentence enhancement after a second conviction. This system has several procedural safeguards, including the right
to a jury trial, the right to confront witnesses, the privilege
against self-incrimination, the "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard, and the application of the rules of evidence.
Monge was convicted of three drug violations. At the
sentencing hearing, the prosecution sought to have his sentence enhanced based on a prior assault with a deadly
weapon conviction. The trial court found that the prior conviction was a sufficient predicate for enhancement. A
California court of appeals subsequently ruled that the evidence was insufficient to warrant enhaAcement. In addition,
the court held that a remand would violate double jeopardy,
basing this decision on Bullington.
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not apply because there is no "offense:•
Sentence determinations are not analogous to an acquittal.
The Court wrote: "[l]t is a 'well-established part of our constitutional jurisprudence' that the guarantee against double
jeopardy neither prevents the prosecution from seeking review of a sentence nor restricts the length of a sentence imposed upon retrial after a defendant's successful appeal."
118 S.Ct. at 2251. The Bullington exception was based on
the death penalty sanction. The emotional importance of a
death penalty hearing in addition to its procedural safeguards is what creates the narrow exception in the double
jeopardy rule. Therefore, the Court found that the rehearing
of a sentence enhancement did not qualify as an exception
to the rule.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Criminal-Civil Distinction
In United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), the defendant was convicted of submitting 65 false claims under
the federal Medicare program. While working for a medical
laboratory, he submitted claims for a $12 reimbursement for
$3 procedures. The total amount of the fraud was $585.
Halper was convicted on all 65 counts, as well as 16 counts
of mail fraud, and subsequently sentenced to imprisonment
for two years and fined $5,000. The Government then instituted a civil action under the False Claims Act. Based on
the criminal verdict, the trial court granted summary judgment. Under the Act, a person is liable for $2000 plus two
times the amount of damages for each count. Thus, a statutory penalty of more than $130,000 was required. The
Court found this penalty barred by the double jeopardy safeguard, writing:
We therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy
11Ciause a defendant who already has been punished
~ ,. in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an
additional civil sanction to the extent that the second
sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial,
but only as a deterrent or retribution.
In Hudson v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 488 (1997), the
Supreme Court reversed Halper, replacing its analysis with
the two-step approach set forth in United States v. Ward,
448 U.S. 242 (1980). The Government initially imposed
monetary penalties and occupational disbarment on petitioners for violating federal banking statutes. The petitioners
were later indicted for essentially the same conduct, at
which time they raised the double jeopardy issue.
in the Court's view, "Halper's test proved unworkable,
creating confusion by attempting to distinguish between
'punitive' and 'nonpunitive' penalties:· ld. at 491. Under the
proper approach, the first step is to determine (as a matter
of statutory interpretation) if the legislature intended the
punishment to be criminal or civil. Second, even if the legislature intended a civil penalty, the courts may determine
whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to transform what was clearly intended as
a civil remedy to a criminal penalty. In making this determination, several useful guideposts are relevant: (1) whether
the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint: (2);
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment;
(3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter;
a 'i) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
t- Cnishment-retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an
alternative purpose may rationally be assigned for it; and (7)
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.

POLYGRAPH: RIGHTTO PRESENT A DEFENSE
lh United States v. Sheffer, 118 S.Ct. 1261 (1998). the
U.S. Supreme Court held that adoption of a per se rule of
·exclusion for polygraph evidence is not unconstitutional.
The Court acknowledged once more the right to present a
defense, albeit a qualified right. "A defendant's right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited, but rather is subject
to reasonable restrictions." ld. at 1264. In the Court's view,
evidence "rules do not abridge an accused's right to present
a defense so long as they are not 'arbitrary' or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.
Moreover, we have found the exclusion of evidence to be
unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate only where it has infringed upon a weighty interest of the accused." ld.
Justice Thomas's opinion identified three interests that
support the per se rule of exclusion: (1) ensuring that only
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a right to a jury instruction on lesser-included-offenses. ThE
defendant was convicted of two counts of felony murder an•
sentenced to death. The defendant had raped and murdered two women at a Religious Society of Friends meetin~
house. Both were stabbed. One of the victims identified th1
defendant as the assailant. The police charged the defendant with felony-murder based on the fact that the murders
were committed during the commission of rape. Under
Nebraska law, this is first-degree felony murder. The defendant requested an instruction on second-degree murder
and manslaughter as lesser-included offenses. The trial
court refused. On a habeas corpus petition, the Eighth
Circuit held the failure to instruct unconstitutional under
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980), which had struck
down an Alabama law that prohibited juries from being instructed on lesser-included-offenses in capital cases. This
law created an artificial barrier between capital and noncapital cases because lesser-included-offense instructions were
permissible in the latter.
The Court held that Beck did not mandate jury instructions on offenses that are not lesser included offenses
under state law. It had long been the opinion of the
Nebraska Supreme Court that second-degree murder and
manslaughter are not lesser included offense of felony-murder. Therefore, Beck did not apply. Applying Beck here
would force states to create lesser-included crimes in capital cases when none existed.

reliable evidence is introduced at trial, (2) preserving the
jury's role in determining credibility, and (3) avoiding litigation of collateral issues. Interestingly, Justice Kennedy
along with three other Justices rejected the second and
third interests. As to reliability, Justice Thomas's opinion
notes that "the scientific community remains extremely polarized about the reliability of polygraph techniques." ld. at
1265. Justice Thomas also cited the preservation of the
jury's role in determining credibility. "By its very nature,
polygraph evidence may diminish the jury's role in making
credibility determinations." ld. at 1267. A third reason supporting the per se rule of exclusion is, in Justice Thomas's
view, the avoidance of litigation on collateral issues, which
"prolongs criminal trials and threatens to distract the jury
from its central function of determining guilt or innocence."

Id.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy pointed out
that Federal Rule 704 abolishes the ultimate issue rule and
the "invading the province of the jury" argument has been
rejected under most modern evidence codes. Significantly,
he also wrote:
I doubt that the rule of per se exclusion is wise, and
some later case might present a more compelling case
for introduction of the testimony than this one does.
Though the considerable discretion given to the trial
court in admitting and excluding scientific evidence is
not a constitutional one, ... there is some tension between that rule and our holding today. And, as Justice
Stevens points out [in dissent], there is much inconsistency between the Government's extensive use of
polygraph to make vital security determinations and
the argument it makes here, stressing the inaccuracy
of these tests. ld. at 1269.

Mitigation Instruction
In Buchanan v. Angelone, 118 S.Ct. 757 (1998),
Buchanan was convicted of the murder of his father, stepmother, and two brothers. During the two-day sentencing
hearing, the defense counsel presented evidence of the defendant's background and his mental and emotional prob- '1i
lems. Both the defense counsel and the prosecutor discussed the mitigating factors in the penalty phase. The trial
court refused Buchanan's request for an instruction that
contained the particular statutory definitions of mitigating
factors. The trial court instructed the jury to hand down the
death penalty if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the
conduct was ''vile;· the aggravating factor under state law. In
addition, the trial court instructed the jury to consider all the
evidence when deciding which punishment was appropriate.
Buchanan was sentenced to death.
The Supreme Court found that refusing to instruct the
jury on the particular statutory definitions of mitigating factors did not violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments.
The instruction told the jury to consider all the evidence, including the mitigating factors discussed in the sentencing
hearing. The instructions did not preclude the jury from examining the evidence of mitigating factors. The Court summarized its holding as follows: "This case calls on us to decide whether the Eighth Amendment requires that a capital
jury be instructed on the concept of mitigation evidence
generally, or on particular statutory mitigating factors. We
hold it does not:' ld. at 758-59.

GRAND JURY DISCRIMINATION
In Campbell v. Louisiana, 118 S.Ct. 1419 (1998), the
Supreme Court reversed a decision by the Louisiana
Supreme Court, which had held that a white defendant did
not have standing to bring equal protection, due process,
and Sixth Amendment fair cross-section claims for discrimination against African Americans in grand juries. The
Louisiana Supreme Court found that a white defendant accused of killing another white man did not meet the "considerable and substantial impact" criteria set in Powers v. Ohio,
499 U.S. 400 (1991 ), as a requirement for standing.
A grand jury in Evangeline Parish Louisiana indicted
Campbell for second degree murder. In the history of the
parish no African American had ever been appointed grand
jury foreperson. The Supreme Court held that Campbell did
have standing to bring both due process and equal protection claims for discrimination against African Americans. In
Powers, which concerned discrimination in the use of
peremptory challenges, the Court had set forth three conditions for third-party standing. First, the defendant must suffer an "injury in fact." Second, there must be a close relationship to the excluded juror's. Finally, there must be some
hindrance to the excluded jurors assertion of their own
rights, such as economic disincentives to pursue the issue.
The Court found that all three conditions were satisfied.

Mental Competence
In Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 118 S.Ct. 1618 (1998),
the Supreme Court allowed a second writ of habeas corpus
for incompetence after the first had been denied for being
premature. The respondent was convicted of two counts o1 1"'
first-degree murder and sentenced to death. He lost all direct appeals in Arizona. He filed a number of state habeas
corpus petitions at the same time he filed three federal
habeas petitions. All the federal petitions were denied be-

DEATH PENALTY CONSIDERED

Lesser Included Offenses
In Hopkins v. Reeves, 118 S.Ct. 1895 (1998), the
Supreme Court considered whether a capital defendant had
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cause all state avenues had not been exhausted. Later, respondent filed another petition based on Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399 (1986), in which the Court had decided that
those who are insane cannot be executed. The District
court dismissed this petition for being premature. The Ninth
\ ;ircuit affirmed but stated that its ruling was not based on
· the merits of the petition. On remand, the respondent
sought to reopen the petition, fearing that the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) was in effect. The
AEDPA acts as a gatekeeper, forbidding successive habeas
corpus petitions. The district court refused to reopen the
petition. Later the respondent again sought to reopen the
competence issue and was denied on AEDPA grounds. The
Ninth Circuit reversed and allowed the petition. The
Supreme Court affirmed.
The Supreme Court held that to reopen a previous petition that had been found to be premature is not a "successive" habeas corpus petition. Therefore, it can not be barred
by the AEDPA. This was not a separate petition but only a
reopening of a former petition, according to the Court. The
respondent is entitled to have this claim adjudicated when it
became ripe.

of the other states.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the asylum state is not
the place for a hearing on whether the defendant is a fugitive under Article IV of the Constitution. The Court wrote:
"In case after case we have held that claims relating to what
actually happened in the demanding State, the law of the
demanding State, and what may be expected to happen in
the demanding State when the fugitive returns, are issues
that must be tried in the court of that State, and not in those
of the asylum State:· The Court also held that New Mexico
Constitution's provision guaranteeing the right to seek safety does not prevail over Article IV of the Constitution.
PROSECUTION IMMUNITY
In Kalina v. Fletcher, 118 S.Ct. 502 (1997), the Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the Ninth Circuit, which had
held that prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity
in executing a certification for determination of probable
case. At the commencement of the criminal proceeding the
prosecuting attorney filed a "Certification for Determination
of Probable Cause:' This is the customary practice in
Washington state courts. This document summarized the
evidence in support of the charge and is sworn to by the
prosecutor and resulted in the respondent's arrest and
spending a night in jail. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the respondent brought suit against the prosecutor based on two
inaccurate statements in the certification.·
The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of absolute
prosecutorial immunity did not apply to false statements
used to support arrest warrants. When acting as an advocate, the prosecutor has absolute immunity. The prosecutor
in this case, however, was acting as a complaining witness
and in that function only has qualified immunity. The act of
personally attesting to the truth of the certification was the
only action outside the scope of absolute immunity. The
Court held that ~'[t]estitying about facts is the function of the
witness, not the lawyer:' The Court concluded that when
prosecutors step outside their role they are no longer entitled to the same privileges.

EXTRADITION
In New Mexico ex. rei. Oritiz v. Reed, 118 S.Ct. 1860
(1998), the Supreme Court addressed the extradition of a
fugitive back to Ohio. Reed was paroled from a conviction
for armed robbery and drug theft. Reed fled Ohio to New
Mexico the next year after being informed by prison officials
that they planned to revoke his parole. The Governor of
New Mexico ordered the extradition of Reed. A state
p,upreme court judge, however, granted habeas relief. Reed
~ ,.lygued that he left Ohio under duress because he believed
Ohio authorities would violate his due process rights and
cause him physical harm. The New Mexico Supreme Court
refused the extradition on the basis that the fugitive was not
really a fugitive but a "refugee from injustice." The New
Mexico Court believed that its Constitution's guarantee of
the right to seek asylum prevailed over the extradition rights
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